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“They can see the children in the bed next to them suffocate . . . .
They will say, ‘I know my life will end, but doctor, just don’t let it
end like my friend’s did.’” 1

INTRODUCTION
Although advances in medical technologies have given some
individuals a second chance at life, for others, such “progress” has
merely prolonged their suffering. A number of these terminally ill
patients turn to their doctors with a challenging request: to help them
die with dignity through physician-assisted suicide. 2 Such requests
permit a physician to prescribe a lethal dose of medication for the
terminally ill patient to administer to himself or herself. 3 Unlike adults,
minors are not afforded the right to physician-assisted suicide. 4
Children under the age of eighteen are presumed incapable of
“understanding, deliberating about, and making decisions” regarding
their health care. 5 Instead, parents are afforded the right to make
medical decisions for their children because parents are presumed to
“act in the best interests of their child(ren).” 6 However, children, like
adults, have an interest in bodily integrity and the desire to possess and
control their own person free from restraint. 7 Over the last three
1. Charlotte McDonald-Gibson, Belgium Extends Euthanasia Law to Kids,
TIME (Feb. 13, 2014), http://time.com/7565/belgium-euthanasia-law-childrenassisted-suicide/. Recalling his inability to discuss the possibility of euthanasia with
his minor patient suffering from Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, Dr. Gerlant van
Berlaer, a pediatrician at the University Hospital Brussels explained. Id.
2. Alison C. Hall, To Die with Dignity: Comparing Physician Assisted Suicide
in the United States, Japan and the Netherlands, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 803, 803 (1996).
3. Lara L. Manzione, Is There a Right to Die? A Comparative Study of Three
Societies (Australia, Netherlands, United States), 30 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 443,
445 (2002).
4. See generally id.
5. Robert F. Weir & Charles Peters, Affirming the Decisions Adolescents Make
about Life and Death, 27 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 29, 33 (1997).
6. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979). The United States Supreme
Court addressed parental decision-making power in Parham v. J.R, which stated, “The
law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child
lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s
difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds
of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.” Id. at 602.
7. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
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decades, the legal and medical professions have recognized that
terminally ill children have the capacity to not only understand the
fluctuations of treatment, but also grasp the realities of their illness and
comprehend death and its finality. 8 This Article argues that in light of
the fundamental principle of individual autonomy, states should enact
and/or amend their legislation to allow physician-assisted suicide for
terminally ill minors. 9
Part I discusses two landmark cases, Washington v. Glucksberg10
and Vacco v. Quill, 11 which led to the present right to die legislation in
the United States. Part II reviews this country’s right to die legislation
regarding physician-assisted suicide. Part III defines competency,
8. Melinda T. Derish & Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Mature Minors Should Have
the Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 109,
113 (2000); see infra Discussion Part.III.
9. Although beyond the scope of this Article, all states should amend their
legislation to include the right to die by either euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide
to terminally ill adults and minors with six months or less to live. Similar to physicianassisted suicide, euthanasia is the method of facilitating the passing of a patient
suffering from a terminal illness or condition for reasons of mercy. Euthanasia,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed.1999). The word euthanasia derives from the
Greek word “eu,” which means easy and “thanatos,” which means death. Manzione,
supra note 3, at 445. “For the Greeks and Romans, euthanasia signified a quiet and
easy death, one without suffering.” Deborah A. Wainey, Active Voluntary
Euthanasia: The Ultimate Act of Care for the Dying, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 645, 647
(1989). Euthanasia occurs when a physician administers an injection that intentionally
causes the patient’s death. David Bryant, The Need for Legalization and Regulation
of Aid-in-Dying and End-of-Life Procedures in the United States, 18. QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L.J. 287, 297 (2015). There are two types of euthanasia, active euthanasia
and passive euthanasia. Kristina Ebbott, A “Good Death” Defined By Law:
Comparing the Legality of Aid-in-Dying Around the World, 37 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 170, 172 (2010). Active euthanasia is carried out by a facilitator (usually a
physician) who provides the means of death, and carries out “the final death-causing
act” by administering the lethal agent directly into the patient. Active Euthanasia,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed.1999). Passive euthanasia enables a terminally ill
person to die by withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining support such as a
respirator or feeding tube. Id. This type of euthanasia occurred in In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647, 671–72 (N.J. 1976) (holding if the responsible physicians conclude “there
is no reasonable possibility of [the patient] ever emerging from [a] present comatose
condition to a cognitive, sapient state, the present life-support system may be
withdrawn and said action shall be without any civil or criminal liability therefore on
the part of any participant, whether guardian, physician, hospital or others”).
10. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 702 (1997).
11. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 793 (1997).
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examines theories of child cognitive development, and describes a
child’s concept of death. Part IV explains the exceptions to the
presumptive age of majority and examines the applicability of the
mature minor doctrine in relation to the right to die. Part V compares
and contrasts the Netherlands and Belgium’s right to die laws, the
impact of the reduced age requirement for assisted death in the
Netherlands, and the recent amendment to the 2002 Belgian Euthanasia
Act, which removed all age restrictions for euthanasia. Incorporating
aspects from right to die laws in the Netherlands and Belgium, Part VI
proposes amendments to present right to die laws in the United States
and offers guidelines that can be used to determine a minor’s
competence. This Article ultimately concludes all states should seek to
implement assisted suicide legislation to include the right to die with
dignity by physician-assisted suicide to everyone, regardless of age.
I. UNITED STATES CASE LAW REGARDING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE FOR ADULTS
The first major challenge to physician-assisted suicide occurred in
the United States Supreme Court case Washington v. Glucksberg. 12 In
Glucksberg, three terminally ill patients, four physicians, and
Compassion in Dying (a non-profit organization) argued a Washington
statute criminalizing physician-assisted suicide was unconstitutional. 13
The Court held an individual does not have an asserted right to assisted
suicide because suicide “is not a fundamental liberty interest protected
by the Due Process Clause” of the United States Constitution.14 As a
result, as long as the law was rationally related to a legitimate
government interest, physician-assisted suicide would remain a
criminal act. 15 The Court defined the following as legitimate

12. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702.
13. Rena Patel, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Is it Time?, 35 CAL W.L. REV. 333,
341 (1999); see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702. The Washington statute at issue
provided, “A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he or she
knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide.” WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.36.060(1) (1994).
14. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
15. Id. at 728.
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government interests: 16 (1) the preservation of human life; 17 (2)
“protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession;” 18 (3) the
need to protect, not blur, the “time-honored line between healing and
harming;” 19 (4) “protecting vulnerable groups—including the poor, the
elderly, and disabled persons from abuse, neglect, and mistakes;” 20 and
(5) protecting individuals from involuntary euthanasia based on assisted
suicide abuses in the Netherlands. 21
The second challenge to state law prohibiting physician-assisted
suicide occurred in Vacco v. Quill. 22 In Vacco, three physicians and
three patients challenged the “constitutionality of New York statutes
making it a crime to aid a person in committing suicide.” 23 The
plaintiffs argued banning physician-assisted suicide violated the Equal
Protection Clause because a competent person refusing life-sustaining
treatments (which is permitted) and physician-assisted suicide were
“essentially the same thing.” 24 Instead, the Court held New York’s
statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because distinctions
exist between physician-assisted suicide and refusing life-sustaining
treatment based on the “fundamental legal principals of causation and
intent.” 25
In terms of causation, a distinction was made “between refusal of
medical treatment and physician-assisted suicide.” 26 For instance,
“when a patient refuses life-sustaining treatment,” the patient’s death

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 731.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 734.
22. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 793.
23. Patel, supra note 13, at 342–43. The New York statute at issue provided,
“[A] person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when . . . [h]e intentionally
causes or aids another person to commit suicide.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15
(McKinney 1967). “A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he
intentionally causes or aids another person to attempt suicide.” Vacco, 521 U.S. at 796
n.1.
24. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 798.
25. Id. at 801.
26. Patel, supra note 13, at 343.
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results from “an underlying fatal disease or pathology.” 27 In a
physician-assisted suicide situation the patient ingests a lethal dose of
medication prescribed by the attending physician, making the doctor
and the prescribed medication the cause of death rather than the
underlying disease. 28 In terms of intent, the Court concluded a
physician who hastens death by honoring a patient’s refusal of lifesustaining treatment by withdrawing or administering “palliative
treatment,” which intends only to “respect the patient’s wishes,” shows
the physician’s purpose is to ease the patient’s suffering, and not to
cause death. 29 The Supreme Court “declined to recognize a
constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide,” 30 thereby leaving the
decision of physician-assisted suicide to the states to legislate and
regulate. 31
The issues surrounding death and whether to legalize or prohibit
certain forms of assisted suicide vary from country to country. In the
United States, the American Medical Association’s (“AMA”) Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs stated, the “sanctity of the
physician/patient relationship” and a physician’s ethical obligations
“grounded in the Hippocratic Oath” restrict physicians from
participating in assisted suicide. 32 The AMA argues, similar to the
Vacco Court, assisted suicide is “simply an intentional taking of the
patient’s life, even if it is with patient consent.” 33 Despite the AMA’s
opinion, right to die legislation has been passed in both the United

27. Vacco, 521 U.S at 801.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 802.
30. Katherine A. Chamberlain, Looking for a “Good Death”: The Elderly
Terminally Ill’s Right to Die by Physician-Assisted Suicide, 17 ELDER L.J. 61, 69
(2009).
31. Id. at 70.
32. Andrew Benton, Personal Autonomy and Physician-Assisted Suicide: The
Appropriate Response to a Modern Ethical Dilemma, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 767, 778
(1994). Furthermore, two duties in the Hippocratic Oath are incompatible: the promise
to relieve suffering, and the promise to prolong and protect life. JOSEPH FLETCHER,
MORALS AND MEDICINE: THE MORAL PROBLEMS OF: THE PATIENT’S RIGHT TO KNOW
THE TRUTH, CONTRACEPTION, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, STERILIZATION,
EUTHANASIA 172 (1979).
33. Patel, supra note 13, at 335.
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States and abroad. 34 Since the Glucksberg and Vacco decisions, five
states have legalized physician-assisted suicide. 35 This evidence shows
it is “morally preferable” for the patient to choose to die by physicianassisted suicide rather than “linger on in torment until death.” 36
II. RIGHT TO DIE IN OREGON, WASHINGTON, VERMONT, MONTANA,
CALIFORNIA, AND COLORADO
Four months after the Supreme Court decided Glucksberg and
Vacco, Oregon enacted its Death with Dignity Act. The Act allows
terminally ill adult residents of Oregon to receive assistance in death
from a physician by means of a lethal prescription. 37 To request
physician-assisted suicide the patient must be:
[1] An adult 38 who is capable, [2] is a resident of Oregon, 39 and [3]
has been determined by the attending physician and consulting
physician to be suffering from a terminal disease, 40 and [4] who has
voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die. 41

Additionally, a patient’s wish to die must be made voluntary and in
writing. 42 The written request must be “signed and dated by the patient,
and witnessed by at least two individuals.” 43 At least one of the
witnesses cannot be a relative, “entitled to any portion of the [patient’s]
estate,” or affiliated with the “health care facility where the qualified

34. See infra Discussion Part.III. The AMA’s opinions have no impact on right
to die legislation passed outside of the United States.
35. Christina White, Physician Aid-in-Dying, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 595, 597
(2015).
36. Antonios P. Tsarouhas, The Case Against Legal Assisted Suicide, 20 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 793, 801 (1994).
37. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800–.995 (1997).
38. Id. § 127.800(1) (an adult is defined as someone who is eighteen years or
older).
39. Id. § 127.800(11).
40. Id. § 127.800(12).
41. Id. § 127.800(3).
42. Id. § 127.805(1).
43. Id. § 127.810.
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patient is receiving medical treatment or is a resident.” 44 Following a
fifteen-day waiting period, the patient must reiterate his or her wish to
no longer live in pain, at which point the attending physician may
prescribe a lethal dose of medication to enable the patient to end his or
her life. 45
The Death with Dignity Act incorporates a number of safeguards
to “protect the interests of patients and health care providers.” 46 Under
the Act the attending physician must:
(1) Inform the patient regarding the patient’s medical diagnosis,
prognosis, risks and probable results associated with taking the lethal
medication, and feasible alternatives; 47
(2) “[R]efer the patient to a consulting physician for medical
confirmation of the diagnosis;” 48
(3) Refer the patient to a counselor if either the attending physician
or consulting physician is of the opinion that the “patient may be
suffering from a psychiatric or physiological disorder;” 49
(4) Request, but not require, the patient to notify his or her closest
living relative of the prescription request; 50
(5) Offer the patient an opportunity to rescind his or her request at
any time; 51 and
(6) Prescribe that the lethal medication be taken by the patient
without assistance from any third parties. 52

44. Id. A relative is defined as an individual related by “blood, marriage, or
adoption.” Id. An individual is considered to be affiliated with the health care facility
if they are “an owner, operator, or employee” of the facility. Id.
45. Id. § 127.840.
46. Patel, supra note 13, at 345.
47. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815 (2014).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 127.825.
50. Id. § 127.835.
51. Id. § 127.845.
52. Id. § 127.815. Under component six of the Act, “oral medication may be
difficult or impossible for many terminally ill patients to keep down due to nausea
and other effects of their diseased states. In such circumstances, lethal injection may
be the only alternative for these patients to exercise their rights under the Oregon Act.”
Patel, supra note 13, at 347.
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Additionally, the Act imposes “extensive documentation and
reporting requirements on patients’ medical records.” 53 Since the law
was adopted in 1997, data demonstrates the “implementation is safe,
carried out with the appropriate compassionate intent, and protects its
vulnerable citizens by preventing abuse of the law.” 54 On January 19,
2018, the Oregon Public Health Division reported 143 terminally ill
adults (including 14 who had received the prescriptions in prior years)
died in 2017 from ingesting medications prescribed by physicians under
the Oregon Death with Dignity Act. 55
In 2008, eleven years after Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act was
enacted, Washington State approved Ballot Initiative 1000––modeled
after Oregon’s Act. 56 In 2009, Montana’s Supreme Court held, in
Baxter v. State, although the state’s constitution did not guarantee the
right to physician-assisted suicide, neither Montana case precedent nor
legislative authority considers it against public policy. 57 Therefore,
even though Montana does not have legislation legalizing physicianassisted suicide, the court concluded consent by the patient to be a valid
defense for a physician participating in physician-assisted suicide. 58

53. Patel, supra note 13, at 346; see also § 127.855.
54. Anne Compton-Brown, Examining Patient Integrity and Autonomy: Is
Assisted Death a Viable Option for Adolescents in the United States?, 23 ANNALS
HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 86, 90 (2014).
55. PUB. HEALTH DIV., OR. HEALTH PLAN, OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY
ACT: 2017 DATA SUMMARY OREGON HEALTH AUTHORITY 3 (2017),
http://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNERRESOURCES/EVALUATI
ONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Documents/year20.pdf.
56. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245.010–.904 (2008). The Act states,
An adult who is competent, is a resident of Washington state, and has been
determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to be
suffering from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed his or
her wish to die, may make a written request for medication that the patient
may self-administer to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner
in accordance with this chapter.
Id.
57. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1222 (Mont. 2009). The case involved
Robert Baxter, who was diagnosed with terminal cancer. Id. at 1214. “Baxter wanted
the option of ingesting a lethal dose of medication prescribed by his physician and
self-administered at the time of [his] own choosing.” Id.
58. Id. at 1211.
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On May 20, 2013, Vermont passed the Vermont Death with Dignity
Act. 59 Vermont’s Act, also modeled after Oregon’s Death With Dignity
Act, allows a capable adult patient with fewer than six months to live
to voluntarily submit a request to end “his or her life in a humane and
dignified manner.” 60 The request must be written and witnessed by two
people. 61 Unlike Oregon and Washington, there is no requirement that
the physician and patient have a treating relationship. 62 On June 9,
2015, California enacted the End of Life Option, also modeled after
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act. 63 The Act was influenced by twentynine-year-old California resident, Brittany Maynard, who moved to
Oregon to take advantage of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act. 64
Lastly, on November 8, 2016, Colorado passed Proposition 106, The
End of Life Options Act (also modeled after Oregon’s Death with
Dignity Act), which went into effect on December 16, 2016. 65
A consequence of Washington, Vermont, California, and Colorado
mirroring their right to die legislation after Oregon’s Death with
Dignity Act, is all five states fail to extend physician-assisted suicide to
minors who otherwise meet the requirements. Furthermore, Montana’s
judicially created consent defense is limited to adult patients who
59. White, supra note 35, at 612.
60. Id. at 610; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5283 (2013).
61. Id.
62. White, supra note 35, at 612.
63. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 1.85 § 443-.22 (2015).
64. Mollie Reilly, Right to Die Becomes Law In California, HUFFINGTON POST
(Oct.
6,
2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/right-to-diecalifornia_us_560c6037e4b076812700b6d8. Maynard’s story “gained national
attention,” shedding light on the need for all states to enact right to die laws. Id.
Maynard, a California resident, moved to Oregon to take advantage of the state’s aidin-dying law after being diagnosed with terminal brain cancer because at the time
California had no end of life option in place. Id.
65. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 25-48-103 (2016).
(1) An adult resident of Colorado may make a request, in accordance with
sections 25-48-104 and 25-48-112, to receive a prescription for medical aidin-dying medication if: (a) The individual’s attending physician has
diagnosed the individual with a terminal illness with a prognosis of six
months or less; (b) The individual’s attending physician has determined the
individual has mental capacity; and (c) The individual has voluntarily
expressed the wish to receive a prescription for medical aid-in-dying
medication.
Id.
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provide consent, thereby also limiting physician-assisted suicide to
terminally ill adults. One reason states have denied terminally ill
minors the right to die is because the “demarcation line at the age of
majority (eighteen)” where those “above the line (adults)” are presumed
competent and those “below the line (children)” are presumed
incompetent and, therefore, incapable of making medical decisions. 66
A child’s competence should not turn on the single fact of whether the
child has turned eighteen. Rather, a treating physician should apply a
contoured approach that considers whether a particular minor,
regardless of age, has the capacity to decide to end his or her life. 67
III. COMPETENCY, COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT,
AND THE ACQUISITION OF DEATH
Although the terms capacity and competency are used
Capacity is an
interchangeably, they are not synonymous. 68
individual’s mental or physical ability, evaluated and determined by
physicians. 69 Competency is the ability to make a decision; 70 only a
judge can declare an individual to be legally competent. 71 Courts assess
an individual’s competency to make medical decisions by the presence
or absence of the individual’s ability to communicate choices; the
individual’s ability to understand his or her current situation, treatment
options, and subsequent consequences; and the individual’s ability to
understand relevant information required to make an informed
decision. 72 Applying these factors, a court may find a child competent
in some decisions and not in others. 73 For example, although some
66. Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and
Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L.
& POL’Y 275, 285 (2006).
67. See infra Discussion Part.III.
68. Derish, supra note 8, at 113.
69. Cunningham, supra note 66, at 281.
70. Id. at 280–81.
71. Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy: Should Minors Have a
Right to Make Decisions Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatment?, 49-51 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1, 11 (1996). For example, a physician’s determination of a minor’s competency
is not presumed and can only be determined by a judge. Id.
72. Anthony W. Austin, Medical Decisions and Children: How Much Voice
Should Children Have in Their Medical Care?, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 150 (2007).
73. Id. at 151.
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states find that a child can competently decide to have an abortion
without parental consent, that does not mean she is “per se competent”
to make decisions regarding the right to die. 74
The assessment of minor competency has been expanded upon in
the field of psychology because neither “statutes nor case law provide
clear guidelines for judging competence.” 75 Experiments conducted
during the twentieth century shed light on the cognitive development of
children, their ability to make rational decisions, and their view of
death. 76 For example, in 1978, psychologists Thomas Grisso and Linda
Vierling sought to determine at what age a child is able to give
meaningful consent. 77 Based on a “competence/informed consent
model,” Grisso and Vierling concluded, “[A]dolescents over the age of
fifteen are as competent as adults to make medical treatment
decisions.” 78
In 1983, psychologist C.E. Lewis sought to determine a child’s
perception of who was in control of decisions. 79 Lewis challenged the
notion that only a parent knows when a child needs medical attention. 80
The study was conducted at the University Elementary School at the

74. Id.
75. Austin, supra note 72, at 152; see also Cunningham, supra note 66, at 279.
76. Cunningham, supra note 66, at 282. However, there is still no one theory of
competence. Austin, supra note 72, at 150.
77. Austin, supra note 72, at 153; see also Thomas Grosso & Linda Vierling,
Minors’ Consent to Treatment: A Development Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412,
416, 423 (1978).
78. Grosso & Vierling, supra note 77, at 216, 423. Grisso and Vierling defined
meaningful consent as “‘sufficient intelligence’ to understand and appreciate the
consequences of [his or her] decision.” Id. at 216. Under their theory, a child must be
able to sustain his or her attention to the task at hand, have the “ability to delay
response in process of reflecting on the issues,” and the ability to think in a
“sufficiently differentiated manner” in order to prove that the child is capable of both
indicative and deductive forms of reasoning. Id. at 418.
79. Charles E. Lewis, Decisions Making Related to Health: When Could/Should
Children Act Responsibly, in CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 75, 78 (Gary B.
Melton et al. eds., 1983).
80. Id. The study of “Child Initiated Care” addressed two questions: (1) “[g]iven
the passivity of children in an adult-oriented health care system, what behaviors would
children exhibit if they were free to initiate care on their own (without adult control);”
and (2) “[w]ould participation in the decision-making process related to their own care
have a positive impact on children’s health-related benefits and behaviors.” Id.
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University of California, Los Angeles through a “care card system.”81
Cards were placed in boxes throughout the school from which the
children could take cards, write their name on them, hand them to a
teacher, and go directly to the school nurse. 82 During their visit with
the nurse the children were asked about their medical history,
examined, and presented with the nurse’s diagnosis. 83 The children
were then “asked to formulate options for the treatment” and choose
which option they would like to proceed with. 84 By removing all
parental figures from the decision of when to visit doctors, the children
were forced to adopt internal control. 85 The study showed the number
of visits to physicians (in this case, the school nurse) to ask questions
by children five to twelve years old mirrored the rates of adults thirtyfive to fifty-four. 86 Although the study was limited to non-life
threatening conditions, Lewis concluded, “[C]hildren as young as five
years old are capable of making medical decisions in a way that is
similar to adults.” 87
Child cognitive development researcher, Jean Piaget, more
specifically studied how and when children achieve the ability and
maturity to make adult-like decisions. 88 Piaget found that children
develop through four stages: (1) the sensorimotor stage, 89 (2) the

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. It is important to note that the nurse followed the experiment procedures
only “when there was no threat to the health or welfare of the child.” Id. at 79. If the
child had a high fever of 102 or a serious injury that required immediate medical
attention the child was no longer given decision-making power with regard to their
treatment. Id.
84. Id. at 78.
85. Austin, supra note 72, at 153.
86. Lewis, supra note 79, at 79.
87. Austin, supra note 72, at 154.
88. Lawrence Schlam & Joseph P. Wood, Informed Consent to the Medical
Treatment of Minors: Law and Practice, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 141, 153 (2000).
89. Cunningham, supra note 66, at 282. In the sensorimotor stage, babies learn
about the world through touch, sound, sight, and taste. Id.
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preoperational stage, 90 (3) the concrete operation stage, 91 and (4) the
formal operation stage. 92 Piaget concluded children between eleven
and fifteen:
can engage in pure thought independent of actions they see or
perform. They can hypothesize and draw deductions, understand
theories, and combine them to solve problems . . . . In Piagetian
theory, by the age of fifteen, a child’s thinking has evolved into a
mature state and adult thought exists within the child’s repertoire of
mental functions. 93

In addition to Piaget’s theory, current psychological literature
supports the premise that “a minor acquires a mature understanding of
death before the age of majority (eighteen).” 94 Based on psychologist
Maria Nagy’s research, psychologists have identified three stages of
maturation in a child’s understanding of death. 95 During the first stage,
a child of less than five years old perceives death as temporary or
reversible. 96 In the second stage, a child between the age of five and
nine begins to develop awareness of “death’s finality” and the causes

90. Id. The preoperational stage occurs between the ages of two through seven.
Id. During this time the child learns to communicate, however, they do not have the
ability to understand the consequences of their actions. Id.
91. Id. During the concrete operational stage children between eleven and
twelve begin to think logically and organize their worlds into hierarchies. Id.
92. Cunningham, supra note 66, at 282–83. The final stage, formal operational
stage, runs from thirteen to fifteen. Id. During this time, the child learns to think
hypothetically and reason through multiple options by analyzing possible outcomes.
Id. at 283.
93. Schlam & Wood, supra note 88, at 153.
94. Rosato, supra note 71, at 55.
95. Id. Nagy examined 378 children between the ages of three to ten living in
Budapest before WWII. CHARLES A. CORR & DONNA M. CORR, DEATH & DYING,
LIFE & LIVING 363 (2009). Nagy’s study involved the following: children seven to
ten years old were asked to write down everything that comes to their mind about
death; children six to ten years old were asked to make drawings about death (many
of the older children also wrote explanations of their creations); and discussions were
held with all of the children either about their compositions or drawings, or (in the
case of 3 to 5 year olds) to get them to talk about their ideas and feelings about death.
Id. Nagy’s results were not published until 1948. Id.
96. Id. at 363–64; Rosato, supra note 71, at 56.
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of death, but still views death as only a remote possibility. 97 In the final
stage, a child nine years or older is aware that death is final and
universal. 98 It is during this final stage that the child can name various
causes of death and “recognizes death as a natural process.” 99 Although
researchers agree the “death concept develops progressively” and
“adolescents have a mature understanding of death,” they disagree as to
the age each child acquires an understanding of death. 100
Based on the cognitive development and death recognition research
of children, the American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on
Bioethics supports the finding that minors achieve decisional making
capacity at a much earlier age than is recognized legally. 101 The
Committee has also recommended children be more involved in health
care decisions. 102 Additionally, some experts believe children who
suffer from a terminal illness develop a real maturity because “[w]hat
the child experiences influences his or her maturity and thus also the
way he [or she] thinks about death and thus the significance of the
request he [or she] formulates.” 103 Society too must acknowledge
minors’, suffering from terminal illnesses, ability to “combine their
own decision-making abilities with the advice and consent of their
parents and physicians, and conclude that that the harm of staying alive
far outweighs the harm that would be done by requesting or receiving
assistance in death.” 104

97. CORR & CORR, supra note 95, at 364. During the second stage, death is
“imagined as a separate person” such as the grim reaper, ghost, or skeleton. Id.
98. Id. at 365.
99. Rosato, supra note 71, at 56.
100. Id. at 56–57.
101. Schlam & Wood, supra note 88, at 156.
102. Id.
103. Ludo M. Veny, Law and Ethics. The Belgian Law on Euthanasia and
Minors . . . A Bridge Too Far for the Current Decade?, FIAT JUSTITIA 197, 204
(2015); see infra Discussion Part.VII.
104. Compton-Brown, supra note 54, at 97.
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IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRESUMPTION AGE OF MAJORITY
Under United States law, eighteen is the presumptive age of
majority. 105 However, this is not a bright line age, 106 as several
exceptions have emerged over the years: (1) emergency exception, (2)
emancipation exception, (3) minor treatment statutes, and (4) the
mature minor doctrine. 107 These exceptions were “not intended to
protect the minors’ rights to self-determination,” but were designed to
limit “negative consequences resulting from lack of medical care, such
as significant harm to the child or to the community.” 108
The emergency doctrine is “one of the oldest exceptions” that
permits medical treatment without requiring parental consent. 109 The
doctrine enables physicians to treat minors in emergency situations
without parental consent, because consent is presumed. 110 However,
minors do not have the ability to refuse emergency medical treatment

105. See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 326 (Ill. 1989).
106. Id.
107. Mary Irene Slonina, State v. Physician et al.: Legal Standards Guiding the
Mature Minor Doctrine and the Bioethical Judgment of Pediatricians in LifeSustaining Medical Treatment, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 181, 188 (2007). Additionally,
the 1845 English case of The Queen v. Smith established the common law Rule of
Sevens. Paul Arshagouni, “But I’m an Adult Now. . .Sort of,” 9 J. HEALTH CARE L.
& POL’Y 315, 332 (2006). The rule of sevens established four presumptions: (1)
“minors from birth to age seven had no capacity,” (2) “minors between the ages of
seven and fourteen had a rebuttable presumption of no capacity,” (3) “minors from
age fourteen to twenty-one had a rebuttable presumption of capacity,” and (4) “[t]hose
over twenty-one were presumed to have full capacity.” Molly J. Walker Wilson, Legal
and Psychological Considerations in Adolescents’ End-Of-Life Choices, 110 NW. U.
L. REV. ONLINE 33, 40 (2015); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 622 (1979).
108. Rosato, supra note 71, at 26.
109. Carrie Ayn Smith, A Case for Autonomy: An Examination into an
Adolescent’s Right to Refuse Treatment, 6 (May 1, 2014) (unpublished paper),
http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1578&context=student_schol
arship.
110. Id.
A medical emergency exists where (1) the patient is incapacitated to the
point that she cannot use her mental facilities to reach an informed choice;
(2) the circumstances are life-threatening or serious enough that immediate
treatment is required; and (3) it would be medically imprudent to attempt to
solicit consent from some other authorized person on behalf of the patient.
Schlam & Wood, supra note 88, at 164.
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without parental consent. 111 In other words, the doctrine extinguishes
a minor’s autonomy to refuse treatment while shielding doctors from
liability after providing medical care without parental consent. 112
The second exception, emancipation, is based on the principal that
minors who are independent from their parents should be treated as
adults. 113 Thus, emancipation is not based on principles of competence
but of independence. 114 Circumstances that define an emancipated
minor vary by state. 115 Most states grant minors the right to consent to
or refuse treatment if the minor joins the military, marries, lives away
from his or her parents and is self-supporting, or becomes a parent. 116
Once granted this status, minors have “the same legal rights” and
responsibilities as an adult, and can make their own medical
decisions. 117
The third exception, minor treatment statutes, addresses the
“specific health needs of minors and society.” 118 Most of these
statutory exceptions focus on “specific diseases, conditions, or
treatments.” 119 For example, statutes permitting minors to consent to
care for sexually transmitted diseases were drafted because states feared
that “adolescents would not seek care, if they first were required to
inform their parents and obtain their consent.” 120 States have also
111. Ann Eileen Driggs, The Mature Minor Doctrine: Do Adolescents Have the
Right to Die?, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 687, 691 (2001).
112. Id.
113. Slonina, supra note 107, at 189.
114. Rosato, supra note 71, at 28.
115. Id.
116. Schlam & Wood, supra note 88, at 165. Legislatures have determined that
these circumstances amount to “an act of physical, psychological, or economic
separation from one’s parents.” Id.
117. Slonina, supra note 107, at 189.
118. Jessica A. Penkower, The Potential Right of Chronically Ill Adolescents to
Refuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment—Fatal Misuse of the Mature Minor Doctrine,
45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1165, 1177–78 (1996). “These statutes do not hinge on the
maturity of the minor, nor were they created to further the rights of a minor who
exhibits the maturity of an adult.” Id. Society’s interest in stopping the spread of
sexually transmitted diseases was the motivating force in drafting these laws. Id.
119. Id. at 1178; see also FLA. STAT. § 743.06 (West 2016) (allowing any minor
seventeen years or older to give consent to the donation, without compensation for,
his or her blood).
120. Penkower, supra note 118, at 1178.
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enacted statutes allowing minors to obtain treatment without parental
consent for alcohol and substance abuse, psychiatric care, birth control,
and abortions. 121
The final exception, the mature minor doctrine, is a common law
rule allowing minors to consent to or refuse a particular medical
treatment without parental consent, if they can demonstrate they
understand the risks, consequences, and nature of treatment. 122 A minor
has the capacity to understand the risks, consequences, and nature of
treatment, if the minor has:
(1) an intellectual appreciation of the causal connections between
one’s choices and the consequences that will likely follow, (2) a
realistic affective and evaluative capacity to appreciate the weight
and significance of the risks and benefits, proximate and distant,
associated with one’s choices, and (3) a self-determining capacity to
choose or to decline to make a choice, while not being unduly swayed
by impulse. 123

There is no case law on a minor’s right to physician-assisted suicide or
euthanasia. However, the mature minor doctrine case precedent should
apply where a minor is seeking the right to die.
For example, in 1989, the Illinois Supreme Court, in In re E.G.,
ruled a competent minor has the common law right (rather than a
constitutional right) to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. 124 E.G.
(Ernestine Gregory) was diagnosed with acute non-lymphocytic
leukemia six months before her eighteenth birthday. 125 E.G. refused
blood transfusions, asserting that it violated her religious beliefs as a
Jehovah’s Witness. 126 The court ignored the age of E.G. when making
their determination and held that eighteen “is not an impenetrable
121. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.56(1) (1985) (allowing minors twelve years
and older to consent to outpatient mental health services); FLA. STAT. ANN § 390.025
(West 2016) (permitting a minor to get an abortion without consent of their parent or
legal guardian as long as the treating physician gives actual or constructive notice to
the parent or legal guardian).
122. Schlam & Wood, supra note 88, at 159–60.
123. Wilson, supra note 107, at 40. This criteria focuses on competence, not a
presumptive based on age. Id.
124. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 328.
125. Id. at 323.
126. Id.
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barrier” that precludes a minor from exercising and possessing rights
associated with adulthood. 127 A minor’s right to consent or refuse
medical treatment must be balanced against the state’s interests of
preserving life, protecting the interests of parents and other related third
parties, preventing suicide, and “maintaining the ethical integrity of the
medical profession.” 128 Additionally, there must be “clear and
convincing [evidence] that the minor is mature enough to appreciate the
consequences of [his or] her actions, and that the minor is mature
enough to exercise the judgment of an adult.” 129
In 1990, the mature minor doctrine was reaffirmed by the Maine
Supreme Court in In re Swan. 130 Swan posed the question of whether
Chad, a seventeen-year-old in a permanent vegetative state, could be
taken off life support upon his parents’ request based on his previously
articulated wishes, only a year earlier, to not receive life-sustaining
medical treatment (“LSMT”). 131 The court reiterated, “when an
individual has clearly and convincingly in advance of treatment
expressed his decision not to be maintained by life-sustaining
procedures in a persistent vegetative state, health care professionals
must respect that decision.” 132 The court found Chad’s parents showed
clear and convincing evidence that Chad “would not want to be kept
alive by artificial means should [an] injury render him incapable of
existing otherwise.” 133 Ultimately, Chad’s wishes to be taken off life
support were upheld, and the parents were not held liable for his
death. 134

127. Id. at 325. The court relied on the fact that E.G. was six months away from
her eighteenth birthday and that a psychiatric evaluation found “she had a maturity
level of an eighteen to twenty-one-year-old and the competency to reject the
transfusion even if death would result.” Driggs, supra note 111, at 698.
128. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 328.
129. Id. at 327.
130. In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1206 (Me. 1990).
131. Id. His parents were petitioning the court to find they would not be held
liable if they removed their son’s feeding tubes. Driggs, supra note 111, 699.
132. In re Swan, 569 A.2d at 1204 (citing In re Joseph v. Gardner, 534 A.2d
947, 947 (Me. 1987).).
133. Id. at 1204–05. Chad expressed his desire not to be kept alive on life
support during a discussion with his mother about the Gardner case and at sixteen
stated, “‘If I can’t be myself . . . no way . . . let me go to sleep.’” Id. at 1205.
134. Id. at 1206.
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The mature minor doctrine and the reasoning in E.G. and Swan, are
not the only authorities that can be used by states seeking to implement
legislation to include the right to die by physician-assisted suicide to
minors. For example, the legislative policies in the Netherlands and
Belgium further the discussion regarding a minor’s autonomy and his
or her right to die. 135
V. NETHERLANDS’AND BELGIUM’S RIGHT TO DIE LAWS
A. Netherlands
The right to die in the Netherlands is regulated by the Termination
of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act, (“Netherlands Act”). 136
The Netherlands Act, which was passed April 1, 2002, defines assisted
suicide as “intentionally assisting in a suicide of another person” or
providing the person with the means to do so.137 The Netherlands holds
physicians to the same requirements and procedures for both physicianassisted suicide and euthanasia. 138 A physician and patient may choose
one or the other, depending on the circumstances. 139 Under Article 2
of the Netherlands Act, a doctor involved in physician-assisted suicide
or euthanasia will not be prosecuted if he or she complies with a number
of due care criteria. 140 Specifically, the physician must: (a) be satisfied
the patient’s request is “voluntary and well-considered;” (b) be satisfied
“the patient’s suffering was lasting and unbearable;” (c) “inform[] the
patient about the situation he was in and about his prospects;” (d) be
satisfied “there was no other reasonable solution for the situation;” (e)
“consult[] at least one other, independent physician who has seen the
135. See infra Discussion Part.VI.
136. Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures)
Act 2001, Stb. 2001, 194 (Neth.), https://www.eutanasia.ws/documentos/
Leyes/Internacional/Holanda%20Ley%202002.pdf [hereinafter Termination of Life
on Request and Assisted Suicide Act].
137. Id. at ch. 4.
138. Manzione, supra note 3, at 454. Euthanasia occurs when a physician
administers an injection that intentionally causes the patient’s death. Bryant, supra
note 9, at 297.
139. Id. For example, a severely physically handicapped person might require
death by euthanasia rather than physician-assisted suicide. Id.
140. Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act, supra note 136,
at ch. 2.
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patient and has given his written opinion on the requirements of due
care[;]” and (f) “terminate[s] a life or assisted in a suicide with due
care.” 141 Unlike the physician-assisted suicide statutes enacted in the
United States, the Netherlands Act does not explicitly limit physicianassisted suicides to terminally ill adult patients. 142
(1) The Netherlands Act further provides safeguards depending
on the patient’s age and capacity. 143 The attending
physician may comply with a patient’s request to terminate
his or her life under the following circumstances:
(2) The patient is over the age of sixteen and no longer able to
express his or her will, was deemed capable of making a
reasonable appraisal of his or her own interests before
reaching this state, and has a written declaration requesting
that his or her life be terminated. 144
(3) The patient is between the age of sixteen and eighteen and is
deemed capable of making a reasonable appraisal of his or
her own interests, the attending physician may comply with
the request to terminate his or her life or provide assistance
with suicide, after the parent(s) and/or guardian(s), have
been consulted. 145
(4) The patient is between the age of twelve and sixteen and
deemed able to make a reasonable appraisal of his or her
own interests, and the parent(s) and/or guardian(s) consent
to the termination of life or to assisted suicide. 146

141. Id.
142. Ebbot, supra note 9, at 187. If a patient suffers from psychological illness
such as depression, then the attending physician must consult “at least one other,
independent physician who has seen the patient and has given his written opinion on
the requirements of due care.” Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide
Act, supra note 136, at ch. 2, art. 2. This Article does not take the position that minors
suffering from psychological disorders should be extended the right to die because at
the present time there are no guidelines or data which proves that a minor suffering
from a psychological disorder such as depression is competent enough to make the
decision to die.
143. Id. at ch. 2, art. 2.
144. Id. at ch. 2, art. 2(2).
145. Id. at ch. 2, art. 2(3). This means that although parents must be involved in
the decision making process, their permission is not required. Id.
146. Id. at ch. 2, art. 2(4).
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The Netherlands Act also established a Regional Review Committee,
which evaluates all assisted suicide cases to ensure that the physician’s
duty of due care to his or her patient was satisfied. 147
B. Belgium
On May 16, 2002, the lower house of Parliament passed the Belgian
Act on Euthanasia (“Belgian Act”) by 86 votes for, 51 against, and 10
abstentions. 148 Belgium’s Advisory Committee on Bioethics proposed
the Belgian Act to distinguish “‘euthanasia’ from other life-ending
actions” (such as physician-assisted suicide). 149 Section 2 of the
Belgian Act defines euthanasia “as intentionally terminating life by
someone other than the person concerned, at the latter’s request.”150
According to the Belgian Act, a physician who performs euthanasia
commits no criminal offense if he or she ensures:
[1] the patient has attained the age of majority [eighteen] or is an
emancipated minor, and is legally competent and conscious at the
moment of making the request; [2] the request is voluntary, wellconsidered and repeated, and is not the result of any external
pressure; and [3] the patient is in a medically futile condition of
constant and unbearable physical or mental suffering that cannot be
alleviated, resulting from a serious and incurable disorder caused by
illness or accident. 151

147. Id. at ch. 3, art. 3. “The Commission, composed of a lawyer, physician, and
ethicist, examines each
reported case to determine whether the physician complied with the strict
requirements of the Dutch Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide
(Review Procedures) Act sufficiently to secure immunity from criminal prosecution.”
Compton-Brown, supra note 54, at 98.
148. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Euthanasia Policy and Practice in Belgium:
Critical Observations and Suggestions for Improvement, 24 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 187,
192 (2009).
149. Veny, supra note 103, at 199.
150. The Belgian Act on Euthanasia of May 28th, 2002, 9 ETHICAL PERSP. 182,
182 (Dale Kidd trans., 2002) [hereinafter The Belgian Act on Euthanasia of May
2002].
151. Id.
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The request to die by euthanasia must be made in writing, dated, and
signed by the patient. 152 If the patient is incapable of making a written
request, he or she may designate a person to write the request. 153 This
designated person must have attained the age of majority and not have
any “material interest [i.e. financial benefit] in the death of the
patient.” 154
Before carrying out euthanasia, the physician must comply with a
number of safeguards, which include the following:
The physician must inform the patient about the patient’s “health
condition and life expectancy, discuss with the patient his or her
request for euthanasia and the possible therapeutic and palliative
courses of action and their consequences.” 155
Both the patient and the physician must believe “there is no
reasonable alternative to the patient’s situation and that the patient’s
request is completely voluntary.” 156
The physician must be certain of the “patient’s constant physical or
mental suffering” and have “several conversations with the patient
spread out over a reasonable period of time.” 157
The physician must confer with another physician regarding the
“serious and incurable character of the disorder.” 158 If the consulted
physician believes the patient is not likely to die within “the near
future,” then he or she must consult a second professional in the field
who is either a “psychiatrist or a specialist in the disorder in
question.” 159

Additionally, when a patient is not terminally ill, at least one month
must have passed between the written request and the euthanasia. 160

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 183.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182–83.
Id. at 183.
Id.
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On March 2, 2014, Belgium became the first nation to remove all
formal age restrictions for euthanasia. 161 The revised Act added
safeguards regarding a minor’s right to die. 162 A physician who
performs euthanasia does not commit a criminal offense if: (1) the
patient is a “minor with the capacity of discernment and is conscious at
the moment of making the request;” (2) “the request is voluntary, wellconsidered and repeated, and is not the result of any external pressure;”
and (3) the minor is in “constant and unbearable physical or mental
suffering” resulting from a serious and incurable disorder caused by
illness or accident that cannot be alleviated. 163 Additionally, the
attending physician must consult a child psychiatrist or a
psychologist. 164 The consulted specialist must examine the minor
patient and his or her medical records before certifying in writing that
the child has the capacity of discernment. 165 The minor child or his or
her legal representatives, regardless of whether the child is considered
an emancipated or un-emancipated minor must make a written
agreement for termination of his or her life. 166 If the patient is an unemancipated minor, he or she must obtain unanimous consent from both
parent(s) and/or guardian(s) and the minor’s medical team. 167

161. Duncan Crawford, Belgium’s Parliament Votes through Child Euthanasia,
BBC NEWS EUR. (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe26181615. This means that a patient under the age of eighteen now has the ability to
request the right to die by euthanasia. Id.
162. Id.
163. The Belgian Act on Euthanasia of May 28, 2002, ch. 2, § 3(1) (as amended
Feb. 13, 2014) [hereinafter The Belgian Act Amended] (emphasis added),
http://eol.law.dal.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Law-of-28-May-2002-onEuthanasia-as-amended-by-the-Law-of-13-February-2014.pdf.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at ch. 2, § 3(4).
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TABLE 1 – COMPARING NETHERLANDS’ AND BELGIUM’S RIGHT TO DIE ACTS
Netherlands

Belgium

Act
Euthanasia
Physicianassisted
Suicide
Assisted
Suicide
Defined

Termination of Life on Request Act
Yes

Belgian Euthanasia Act
Yes. Section 2

Yes

Yes

“[I]ntentionally assisting in a suicide
of another person” or providing that
person with the means to do so.” 168

Minimum Age
Illness
Require-ment
for Minors
Procedure
Require-ments
for Minors

12
Terminally ill with six months or
fewer to live.

“[I]ntentionally terminating life
by someone other than the
person concerned, at the
latter’s request.” 169
None
Terminally ill with six months
or fewer to live.

(1) Sixteen or older and no longer
able of expressing their will, but
before reaching this state was deemed
capable of making a reasonable
appraisal of their own interests and
has made a written declaration
requesting their life be terminated,
then the attending physician may
comply with this request. 170
(2) Between sixteen and eighteen and
is deemed incapable of making a
reasonable appraisal of their own
interests, the attending physician may
comply with a request made by the
patient to terminate his or her life or
provide assistance with suicide, after
the parent(s) and/or guardian(s) have
been consulted. 171
(3) Between twelve and sixteen and is
deemed able to make a reasonable
appraisal of his or her own interests,
the attending physician may comply
with the patient’s request if the
parent(s) and/or guardian(s) consent
[verbally and in writing to the
physician] to the termination of life or
to assisted suicide. 172

(1) The minor must have “the
capacity of discernment” and
be “conscious at the moment of
making the request.” 173
(2) The minors request must be
“voluntary, well-considered
and repeated, and is not the
result of any external
pressure.” 174
(3) The minor must be in
“constant and unbearable
physical or mental suffering”
resulting from “a serious and
incurable disorder caused by
illness or accident” that cannot
be alleviated. 175
A child psychiatrist or a
psychologist must be consulted
by the attending physician. If
the patient is an unemancipated minor, the
agreement of the legal
representatives must be made
in writing and consent from
both parent(s) and/or
guardian(s) and the minor’s
medical team is required. 176

168. Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act, supra note 136,
at ch. 1.
169. The Belgian Act on Euthanasia of May 2002, supra note 150, at 150.
170. Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act, supra note 136,
at ch. 2, art. 2(2).
171. Id. at ch. 2, art. 2(3).
172. Id. at ch. 2, art. 2(4).
173. The Belgian Act Amended, supra note 163, at 183.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 182.
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Since the Netherlands passed the Termination of Life on Request
and Assisted Suicide Act, only five children have received assistance in
dying. 177 Statistics show citizens in the Netherlands support the
practice of assisted death and believe “assisted death should be
available to those who want it.” 178 In Belgium, only one case of assisted
suicide of a minor by euthanasia has been reported since lifting the age
restriction in 2014. 179 Furthermore, Belgian poll results demonstrate
seventy-five percent of Belgians support right to die laws permitting
assistance in death to all minors who can demonstrate “a capacity for
discernment through a series of requests and psychological
evaluation.” 180
VI. JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING TESTS AND AMENDMENTS TO PRESENT
RIGHT TO DIE LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Opponents of right to die laws in the United States believe
physician-assisted suicide is “incompatible with the role of a physician
as a healer,” because a doctor’s “duty is to provide treatment, not cause
death,” even if that is what his or her patient wants. 181 Advocates of
right to die laws believe when a physician has exhausted all reasonable
means to reduce pain and suffering, only the terminally ill patient
knows whether a life with “severe, unremitting suffering causes more
harm than assisted death.” 182 Further, this decision should not be
reserved to individuals who have reached an arbitrary number, but
rather to all individuals who have reached the “final stage” of
development, regardless of age. The research offered by psychologists
177. Compton-Brown, supra note 54, at 97 (further information has not been
published to respect the patient and family’s privacy).
178. Id. at 98.
179. Chandrika Narayan, First Child Dies by Euthanasia in Belgium, CNN
(Sept.
17,
2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/17/health/belgium-minoreuthanasia/index.html. On September 17, 2016, a terminally ill seventeen-year old’s
request to die by euthanasia was granted with the consent of his parents. Id. No other
information has been released on the patient’s medical condition to protect the privacy
of his family. Id.
180. Compton-Brown, supra note 54, at 99.
181. Patel, supra note 13, at 334. This argument has been countered by the belief
that “physicians are providers of comfort just as much as they are healers of illness.”
Id. at 335.
182. Compton-Brown, supra note 54, at 89.
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Grisso, Vierling, Lewis, Piaget, and Nagy should be used to create
guidelines similar to those used in the Netherlands and Belgium, which
allows terminally ill minors with six months or less left to live to request
the right to die by physician-assisted suicide. 183
A minor’s request for physician-assisted suicide must be made in
writing by the minor or by a legally appointed guardian. Additionally,
the minor must be a resident of the state in which he or she is requesting
a physician-assisted suicide. Once a request has been made, the minor’s
treating physician will be required to make an initial determination of
whether the minor-patient (1) has a terminal disease and (2) is in
constant and unbearable physical suffering. If the treating physician
determines the child is terminally ill, only has six months or less to live,
and is constantly suffering from unbearable physical pain, the physician
and consulting staff must assess the maturity or capacity of the child.
The following considerations must be evaluated:
(1) whether the minor understands that a choice is being made,
(2) that the choice is one with a reasonable outcome, and
(3) that the minor understands the implications (death) of the
choice. 184
Moreover, the physician must refer the child to a psychiatrist or
psychologist to determine if the child is capable of making a reasonable
appraisal of his or her own interests. Following the child’s
psychological evaluation, the treating physician may comply with the
minor’s request to terminate his or her life by physician-assisted
suicide. However, the minor’s parent(s) and/or guardian(s) must
receive notification (as practiced in the Netherlands and Belgium) of
the minor’s request to die, to ensure that all parties are aware of the final
diagnosis and request. 185

183. See generally The Belgian Act on Euthanasia of May 2002, supra note 150;
Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act, supra note 136.
184. Id.
185. Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act, supra note 136,
at ch. 2, art. 2(3); The Belgian Act Amended, supra note 163, at 182.
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CONCLUSION
“[T]he ultimate self-determination [is] determin[ing] when and how
you’re [going to] die when you’re suffering.” 186

The idea of self-determination over one’s death is not “enshrined
in the Constitution or the laws of the land.” 187 Nevertheless, the
freedom to “choose the time and place of our own death” should be
considered a right regardless of age. 188 It must be recognized that
children also have an interest in the “possession and control” of their
body when their happiness is replaced with endless suffering from a
terminal disease. 189 The right of a child to end his or her own life
“without interference from others, but with help if he [or she] chooses”
from a physician is “the ultimate act of love, compassion, mercy” and
civil liberty. 190

186. People of the State of Michigan v. Jack Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 300
(Mich. 2001).
187. Robert L. Risley, Ethical and Legal Issues in the Individual’s Right to Die,
20 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 597, 609 (1993).
188. Id.
189. See id. at 600.
190. See Tsarouhas, supra note 36, at 800–01.
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